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Abstract
This paper proposes a theoretical growth model where seigniorage can be used to finance
productive public spending, and show the existence of nonlinear effects between seigniorage
and economic growth. Empirical evidence based on panel regression techniques provides
some support for these nonlinear effects on a sample of OECD countries over the 1978-2005
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1. Introduction 
 
  Early theoretical growth models conclude that inflation is harmful or at best neutral to 
economic growth, as Palivos & Yip (1995). Empirical work in Alexander (1997) emphasizes 
similar conclusions, but Paul et al. (1997) and Arai et al. (2004) question the robustness of 
this result. Further contributions isolate a negative correlation between inflation and economic 
growth,  but  only  for  high  inflation  (Black  et  al.,  2001,  or  Bolton  &  Alexander,  2001), 
suggesting  that  the  relation  between  inflation  and  growth  is  probably  nonlinear  (Kim  & 
Willett, 2000). 
 
  The aim of this paper is to emphasize the presence of nonlinearities between monetary 
policy and economic growth. For this matter, we develop in the next section a theoretical 
model allowing for nonlinear effects of seigniorage on growth. The empirical validity of these 
nonlinear effects is demonstrated in section 3 for a sample of OECD countries using panel 
regression techniques over the 1978-2005 period. Concluding remarks are reported in section 
4. 
 
2. The model 
 
  We  consider  a  closed  economy  with  a  representative  agent,  a  government  and 
monetary authorities. The agent maximizes intertemporal utility, with a log-utility based on 
consumption ( 0 t c > ) and  0 > b  the subjective discount rate
1: 
 




exp b ,                (1) 
 
Output  t y  is produced with private capital  t k  and the flow of productive public spending  t g , 
with  1 0 < < e  the elasticity of output to private capital and we assume no congestion, as in 
Barro (1990) (all variables are expressed per capita): 
 
 
e e - =
1
t t t g k y                     (2) 
 
Household budget constraint is, in real variables ( x dt dx x " º , / & ): 
 
  ( ) t t t t t t t m k c y m k p d t - - - - = + 1 & &               (3) 
 
  Households use their income ( ) t y  to consume ( ) t c , invest ( ) t t t z k k d = + & , with d  the 
private capital depreciation rate, and pay flat-rate taxes on output  ( ) t y t , as in Barro (1990). 
We depart from Barro (1990) by assuming that agents hold money. The real balance stock is 
/ t t t m M P = , with  t M  the nominal money stock and  t P  the price level.  / t t t P P p = &  is the 
inflation rate, hence real money stock depreciation per unit of time is  t t m p . To motivate a 
money demand, we introduce a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint on all spending
2: 
                                                 
1 Results are not modified for a more general isoelastic function ( ) ( ) ( ) s
s - - =
- 1 / 1
1 c c v t , with  0 > s  the 
inverse of the constant elasticity of substitution (see Minea & Villieu, 2007). 
2 With a CIA on consumption only, raising money is always growth enhancing (Turnovsky, 1996).   2 
 
t t t t m g z c = + +                   (4) 
 
  Monetary authorities supply the nominal money stock  t M . Equilibrium on the money 
market determines the price level  t t t m M P / = . We are interested in monetary policies that set 
an exogenous growth rate for money supply  q = t t M M / & . Monetary authorities collect real 
seigniorage  t t t m P M q q = /  and transfer it to government: 
 
  t t t m y g q t + =                    (5) 
 
  Relation  (5)  departs  from  the  Barro  (1990)  budget  constraint  ( ) t t g y t = ,  since 
seigniorage  can  be  used  for  government  finance,  as  in  Palivos  &  Yip  (1995).  However, 
Palivos  &  Yip  (1995)  consider  exogenous  unproductive  public  spending,  while  they  are 
endogenous in our framework. 
 
  Maximizing (1) subject to (2)-(3)-(4),  0 k  given and a standard transversality condition, 
yields the traditional Keynes-Ramsey relation (we further omit for the sake of simplicity time 
indexes)  b g - = º r c c/ & , with r  the real interest rate. If investment is money-constrained, as 
in (4), the real interest rate becomes  ( ) ( ) d - + = i k y r 1 / ' , with  i the nominal interest rate 
(Stockman, 1981). The return on private investment  ( ) k y'  must be deflated by the monetary 
financing cost of new capitals  ( ) i + 1 ; hence  r  stands for (net of monetary financing costs) 
private capital productivity. Under the technology (2) and flat-rate taxes, the real interest rate 
is  ( )( ) ( ) d t e
e - + - =
- i k g r 1 / / 1
1 .  Using  the  government  constraint  (5),  money  market 
equilibrium  p q - = m m/ &  and the Fisher equation  p + = r i , we find steady-state economic 
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We can then demonstrate the following result: 
 
Proposition 1: 
(a)   An inverted-U curve exists between money and economic growth; 
(b)  The optimal money growth rate is an increasing function of the tax rate. 
(c)   An inverted-U curve exists between taxes and growth. 
 
Proof:  
(a) and (b): using the first order condition  ( ) 0 / , = ¶ ¶ q q t g  we get the growth-maximizing 








q , which is inversely related to taxes. 
 
(c): Using the first order condition  ( ) 0 / , = ¶ ¶ t q t g , the growth maximizing flat-rate tax is 
eq e t - - =1
* , with a similar explanation as in Barro (1990). 
   3 
  To enlighten Proposition 1a,b, remark that any increase in seigniorage is devoted to 
productive public expenditures that are  growth-enhancing (numerator of (6)), but such an 
increase simultaneously raises the financing cost of private investment, which is harmful to 
growth  (denominator  of  (6)).  The  trade-off  between  these  two  effects  illustrates  that 
productive public spending crowd-out private investment, results in the ceiling 
* q . As tax rate 
increases, the elasticity of public spending to seigniorage decreases, which explains why 
* q  is 
inversely related to t . Our findings reproduce numerous empirical results emphasizing the 
existence of threshold (nonlinear) effects between seigniorage or inflation
3 and growth. For 
instance, Thirlwall & Barton (1971) identify the positive effects of inflation rates inferior-to-
8%,  on  growth  and  negative  effects  for  inflation  higher-than-10%.  Gylfasson  (1991) 
associates high-growth countries with lower-to-5% inflation rates, and low-growth economies 
to  inflation  higher  than-20%,  while  Sarrel  (1996)  and  Bolton  &  Alexander  (2001)  find  a 
breakpoint in inflation to growth relation. 
 
3. Empirical link between monetary policy and economic growth 
 
3.1 The effects of seigniorage on economic growth 
 
  To  investigate  the  empirical  validity  of  our  theoretical  results,  we  perform  panel 
regressions on a sample of 22 OECD countries
4 using annual data covering the period 1978-
2005. Selected variables are real GDP growth (g ) and the tax rate (t , computed as the fiscal 
and non-fiscal total revenues of public administration to GDP ratio) from OECD Economic 
Perspectives, with money  growth  q  from the IMF database IFS. Table  1 exhibits results 
related to the estimation of a model including fixed effects in accordance with data properties. 
 
Table 1 – The nonlinear relation between seigniorage and economic growth 
 
  Dependent variable: real GDP growth rate 
  [i]  [ii]  [iii] 
average dummy   0.026  0.026  0.025 
q   0.022 (0.012)
*    0.024 (0.012)
** 
2 q   -0.031 (0.009)
***  -0.029 (0.010)
***   
t q *     0.035 (0.029)   
t q *
2       -0.062 (0.015)
*** 
Observations ( ) NT   581  561  561 
Countries   22  22  22 
Adjusted 
2 R   0.2008  0.2032  0.2116 
F  Fisher  3.827 [0.00]  3.801 [0.00]  4.058 [0.00] 
 
Notes:  
a - standard errors are into parenthesis, p-values into brackets; we introduce country fixed effects using 






                                                 
3 Generally, long-run inflation ( g q p - = ) positively depends on seigniorage. 
4 Australia,  Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the 
United States. Burdekin et al. (2004) suggest not to mix developed with developing countries when assessing 
inflation effects on output.   4 
  Significant  coefficients  in  regression  [i]  confirm  the  presence  of  nonlinearities 
between  growth  and  seigniorage,  describing  an  inverted-U  shape  (negative  square-money 
growth  coefficient)  with  positive  economic  growth-maximizing  money  growth  (positive 
money growth coefficient).  
 
  While these results sustain our theoretical findings in Proposition 1a, we further give 
interest to Proposition 1b. For this matter, we specify a quadratic model in q  and allow the 
optimal  money  growth  rate  to  linearly  depend  on  the  tax  rate.  In  regressions  [ii] 
it it it it i it u + + + =
2
2 1 q a t q a m g  and [iii]  it it it it i it u + + + = t q a q a m g
2
2 1 , seigniorage and square-
seigniorage respectively are multiplied by the tax rate. 
 
  Both models [ii] and [iii] exhibit inverted-U curves with positive optimal seigniorage 
values  (see  Table  1).  Nevertheless,  they  imply  opposite  correlations  between  the  optimal 
seigniorage value 
* q  and the tax ratet . In model [ii], the maximum  ( ) 2 1
* ˆ 2 / ˆ ˆ a t a q - =  implies 
a positive correlation, while in model [iii] the maximum  ( ) t a a q 2 1
* ˆ 2 / ˆ ˆ - =  implies a negative 
correlation. However, as in model [iii] all estimated coefficients are significant, which is not 
the case for model [ii], we focus on what follows in model [iii]. As emphasized above, in this 
model  the  growth-maximizing  estimated  seigniorage  rate  is  inversely  related  to  taxes 
t q / 194 . 0 ˆ* = , confirming the robustness of Proposition 1b. 
 
3.2 Nonlinear joint effects between seigniorage, taxes and economic growth 
 
In accordance with Proposition 1, both taxes and seigniorage exhibit nonlinear effects on 
economic growth. Next, we investigate the presence of a joint nonlinear relation between 
seigniorage, taxes and growth, in which both optimal money 
* q  and taxes 
* t  would depend 
on t  and q  respectively. Consequently, our regressions must enclose square-money growth 
and  square  taxes  (for  possible  inverted-U  curves),  but  also  a  multiple  of  q t * .  Table  2 
summarizes results. 
 
Table 2 – The joint nonlinear relation between taxes, seigniorage and growth 
 
  Dependent variable: real GDP growth rate 
  [A]  [B]  [C]  [D]  [E] 
average dummy  0.013  0.026  0.042  0.025  0.039 
q   0.020 (0.012)
*        0.054 (0.029)
* 
2 *q t     -0.054 (0.022)
**    -0.015 (0.025)  -0.029 (0.029) 
q t *       0.034 (0.029)  0.348 (0.114)
***   
2 q   -0.029 (0.009)
***    -0.029 (0.010)
***     
t   0.132 (0.182)        -0.031 (0.034) 
q t *
2     -0.050 (0.067)    -0.719 (0.261)
***  -0.213 (0.063) 
2 t   -0.231 (0.216)    -0.084 (0.033)
***     
Obs. ( ) NT   561  561  561  561  561 
Countries  22  22  22  22  22 
Adj. 
2 R   0.2134  0.2053  0.2123  0.2189  0.2174 
F  Fisher  4.87 [0.00]  3.87 [0.00]  3.95 [0.00]  4.15 [0.00]  3.98 [0.00] 
Notes: 
a - standard errors are into parenthesis, p-values into brackets; we introduce country fixed effects using 




*10% significance.   5 
  Note  first  the  presence  of  non-significant  coefficients  in  all  [A]-[E]  regressions. 
Depending on the selected model, an inverted-U relation exists on either taxes or seigniorage, 
but never a joint significant one. These results may receive at least two interpretations. First, 
despite five different specifications, we may have been unable to avoid colinearity problems 
between  variables.  One  solution  would  be  to  search  for  econometrical  specifications  that 
avoid  these  colinearities.  Secondly,  it  may  emphasize  that  models  [B]-[E]  are  unable  to 
vigorously approximate our theoretical relation. Precisely, quadratic form may well reproduce 
individual inverted-U curves, while less adapted to approximate joint inverted-U curves. 
 
  To deal with this issue, we directly consider equation (6). For this purpose, assuming 
d  and b  sufficiently small, one can log-linearize (6) and get: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) t t t e e t e g + + + - + - + = 1 log log * / 1 1 log log log       (7) 
, with  ( ) e a log 0 º  and ( ) e e / 1-  included in  2 a . 
 
We then estimate the following equation on the same panel data set of OECD countries: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) it it it it it i it u + + + + + - + = q a q t a t a a g 1 log log 1 log log 3 2 1 0       (8) 
 
Table 3 –  ( ) q t g ,  
  ( ) g Log  
average dummy  -0.396 
( ) t - 1 Log   3.299 (0.327)
*** 
( ) q t + Log   1.801 (0.315)
*** 
( ) q + 1 Log   -2.985 (0.693)
*** 
Obs. ( ) NT   502 
Countries ( ) N   22 
Adjusted 
2 R   0.1982 
F  Fisher  3.273 [0.00]  
 
Notes:  
a - standard errors are into parenthesis, p-values into brackets; we introduce country fixed effects using 




  All  coefficients  are  now  significant  with  a  sign  in  accordance  with  theoretical 
expectations (positive for  t - 1  and  q t +  and negative for  q + 1 ). These econometric results 
provide evidence in favor of the theoretical model developed in section 2, and emphasize the 
empirical relevance of a joint inverted-U relation between taxes, seigniorage and growth. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
We developed in this paper a theoretical model allowing for the seigniorage financing of 
productive public spending. In line with numerous recent empirical stylized facts (Kim & 
Willett, 2000, Black et al., 2001, Bolton & Alexander, 2001), we emphasized the presence of 
nonlinearities between seigniorage and economic growth. Empirical evidence based on panel 
regression techniques on a sample of 22 OECD countries using annual data over the 1978-
2005 period support the predictions of our theoretical model. We also tested for a structural   6 
equation to investigate the existence of a joint inverted-U relation between both seigniorage 
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